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1. Introduction  
 
Rules of Origin (RoO) are integral to the proliferating Free Trade Areas (FTAs) or the 
non-reciprocal Preferential Trading Arrangement (PTAs)  such as the Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP). RoO are necessary in any PTA to prevent trade 
deflection, by which is meant that the country with the lowest external tariff acts as 
port of entry for the entire bloc’s imports, depriving partners of tariff revenue. RoO 
are about to become important in the trade policy landscape in Asia as at least 45 but 
up to 70 discriminatory trade deals will be in existence at the end of 2006.  
 
Typically RoO are defined at the HS-6 tariff level. However, the Harmonized System 
(HS) was not designed as a vehicle for conferring origin, its purpose being to provide 
a unified commodity classification for defining tariff schedules and for the collection 
of statistics. As a result, devising methods for determining sufficient processing or 
substantial transformation has turned out to be very complex in all existing PTAs, 
notably for the two big players, the EU and the US, which use three categories of 
criteria to determine if sufficient transformation has taken place in activities that 
require processing:  (i) change of tariff classification; (ii) a critical threshold for value-
added (in short a ‘value content’ (VC) rule); and (iii) specific manufacturing 
processes. 
 
Currently under AFTA, ASEAN - China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) and the other 
regional Asian FTAs under negotiation involving the Korea and Japan, bilaterals with 
ASEAN nations, to obtain originating status (i.e. to fulfill the criterion of sufficient 
processing), either of two criteria is used. The” wholly obtained” criterion is used for a 
few agricultural products. For the vast majority of products, a single value content 
rule requiring that 40% of the value of the final product must originate from the 
countries belonging to the FTA (i.e. non-originating imports cannot exceed 60% of 
the value of the final product) is used  in combination with diagonal cumulation (see 
below). This criterion is remarkably simple compared with the criteria described here 
which are used notably by the two major players, the EU and the US.1 This paper 
argues that it should be kept so. 
 
However, keeping the present simple system might prove to be difficult because 
intra-regional trade is likely to rise sharply as the economies integrate. Given the 
limits to other forms of protection imposed by WTO membership, the candidate 
outlet for rising protectionist pressures could be a move towards a complex system of 
RoO (‘the US and the EU did it, so why shouldn’t we follow in their footsteps!’).  
 
East Asia is now entering a phase of very active regional integration. That integration 
will certainly extend beyond preferences in goods trade with a rich variety of expected 
gains from regional integration (see e.g. Antkiewicz and Whalley (2004), and Banda 
and Whalley (2005)). However, in spite of substantial unilateral tariff reductions, 
preferential market access will still be a key component of that regionalism.  With 
preferential market access on the rise, and with more trade taking place regionally, 
the adoption of complex product-specific RoO (PSRO) could turn out to be key in the 
negotiations of tariff elimination among trading partners. Thus with trade conflicts 
likely to occur in the region as the volume of trade continues to increase, this conflict 
                     
1 The EU uses such a RVC rule-only for 11.46% of its tariff lines, while the US does not use any RVC 
rule-only.   3
could largely play out in RoO, a trade policy instrument that has so far eluded any 
discipline from the World Trading System.  With the large number of trading 
arrangements under way, it is very plausible that lobbying activities will resemble 
those in other PTAs like those involving the US and EU with lobbies in the most 
powerful partners managing to justify ‘made-to-measure’ RoO to maximize rent-
extraction to their benefit at the expense of the weaker partners. 
 
This paper argues that a move in that direction should be avoided. It does so by 
presenting evidence on the costs of the complex RoO put in place by the EU and the 
US on their trading partners.  Indeed, the experience with RoO elsewhere shows that 
RoO diminish the value of preferences, in effect reducing the market access that the 
preferences are intended to provide in the first place beyond what would appear to be 
“sufficient” transformation to confer “legitimate” origin.  Hence, the main message of 
the paper for the AFTA partners is to avoid the (tempting) trap of moving towards 
more complex RoO resembling those observed in other preferential trading 
agreements (PTAs). To use a well-worn expression, RoO should be “business 
friendly” rather than “business owned”.   
 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 details the RoO of the EU (these are the 
rules that AFTA countries must comply with to benefit from the GSP) and those 
under NAFTA (a variant of these have been adopted in other FTAs involving the US). 
Section 3 discusses the economics of RoO and what we learned about the effects of 
RoO from NAFTA and the US experience. Section 4 presents new results that should 
be of use for AFTA. Exploiting data on tariff lines where a minimum regional VC  is 
the sole criterion for establishing origin, we estimate utilization rate responses to 
changes in preference margins and in the stringency of the VC rule. Section 5 
concludes.  
 
2. Rules of Origin in US and EU PTAs  
 
With the exception of AFTA (and a few others like ANZERTA and ANZSCEP—see 
Table A1), RoO in PTAs have two components: a regime-wide set of rules and 
product-specific rules of origin (PSRO). These are described in the annex where Table 
A1 lists the regime-wide rules and Table A2 the PSRO criteria negotiated between 
Mexico and the US in the context of  NAFTA and the so-called PANEURO single-list 
regime used by the EU in all its PTAs. Table A1 confirms that AFTA has a much 
simpler set of criteria, since it relies only on a minimum share of originating value 
among partners (which is equivalent to maximum value of non-originating imports).2 
Of course, this minimum originating VC applies at the product level so in a sense it is 
also a PSRO but because it is uniform, in effect it is a level-playing field and AFTA 
does not have PSRO.  The EU also uses the VC criterion extensively, though most 
often this criterion is used along with other criteria (see Table 1 and Table A2).  
 
For AFTA, the VC rule is also its regime-wide rule. AFTA, like the EU PTAs, also 
provides for diagonal cumulation which is less stringent than the more usual bilateral 
cumulation rule applied in the PTAs described in Table A1. Under diagonal 
cumulation, countries tied by the same PTA can use materials that originate in any 
                     
2 More precisely, the RoO requires that the non-originating import content be less than 60 percent of 
the FOB price of the product where the value of non-originating materials is based upon the CIF 
import price or the earliest ascertained price for products of undetermined origin.   4
member country as if the materials were originating in the country where the 
processing is undertaken.3 However, since the domestic content can be an aggregate 
of value-added in any ASEAN member state, AFTA provides in effect for full 
cumulation although, as noted by  Brenton (2006), the rules stipulate that the final 
stage of manufacture must be carried out in the exporting member state (what 
constitutes ‘the final process’ is not defined). Because vertical linkages and 
outsourcing are very important in Asia (see below), full cumulation relaxes 
considerably the requirements of satisfying origin. Thus under full cumulation, the 
more developed higher labor cost countries can outsource labor-intensive, low-tech, 
production stages to less developed lower-wage partners whilst maintaining the 
preferential status of the good produced in the low-cost locations. 
 
Table 1 tabulates the criteria used for PRSO under PANEURO and NAFTA. It shows 
that the two regimes use a large list of criteria. These typically include technical 
requirements (such as the triple transformation requirement in textiles and apparel 
which requires that apparel must be woven from originating fabric and from 
originating yarn). The criteria also include exceptions and allowances.  NAFTA relies 
more heavily on a change of tariff classification (CTC), though often accompanied by 
other criteria. PANEURO relies mostly on a VC and on the Wholly obtained (WH) 
criterion (this criterion is not used in NAFTA since Mexicans export far fewer 
agricultural exports than GSP and ACP countries).  
 
The key issue is how RoO affect the utilization of preferences (i.e. do importers end 
up using the MFN status when preferences would suggest they should claim for 
preferential status)?  Table 2 and Figure 1 show average utilization rates computed 
for different thresholds of minimum preferential margins for NAFTA and for the two 
EU preferential schemes, the Generalized system of preferences (GSP) for which 
ASEAN countries (except Singapore qualify) and the Cotonou preferences which 
benefit the former colonies of the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) regions.4 Since 
there are administrative costs (see below), only utilization rates above 4% are 
considered in Table 2 which also shows in parenthesis the number of tariff lines over 
which utilization rates are computed.  
 
As a reference, the average preferential margin (computed over tariff lines with 
positive tariffs) was 4.5% for NAFTA (almost all tariffs had been eliminated on 
NAFTA trade by 2001), 2.4% for GSP-eligible countries and 4.6% for ACP countries 
(not eligible for EBA status). EU data is for 2004, when 62% of trade for GSP-eligible 
countries took place at zero tariffs and over 80% for ACP countries (some ACP also 
benefiting from EBA status at zero tariffs in the EU market). 
 
Several patterns stand out.   First, utilization rates by Mexican exporters are 
systematically higher than for the EU than under GSP. This could reflect several 
factors including closer proximity and knowledge of the US market, but also less 
stringent RoO rules or greater administrative costs for EU schemes than for NAFTA 
                     
3 See the appendix for a definition of bilateral, diagonal and full cumulation.  
4 The reason for distinguishing between GSP and ACP utilization rates is that ACP preferences have 
been in effect longer, that all tariff lines qualify for ACP status, that some GSP-eligible countries also 
qualify for EBA but have chosen not to use the more favorable status, perhaps because these 
preferences were only in effect since 2002 or finally because of slightly more stringent regime-wide 
rules for GSP-eligible countries than for ACP countries. Also all AFTA countries except Singapore 
qualify for GSP status.   5
(e.g. relating to certification methods).5 The differences in utilization patterns also 
probably reflect partly differences in the composition of exports.  
 
Second, utilization rates are systematically higher for ACP countries than for GSP 
countries (this is why the number of tariff lines is always greater for ACP countries 
than for GSP countries at any tariff line, even though there are fewer ACP (78) than 
GSP (92) countries). 6 Again, it could be that better knowledge of procedures (same 
language for former colonies) are a factor,  but the combination of higher preference 
margins and better market access due to less stringent rules of origin must also be a 
determining factor. Regarding RoO, the regime-wide rule for ACP countries are less 
restrictive that for GSP qualifiers since they benefit from full cumulation rather than 
diagonal cumulation and they have a more favorable tolerance rule (15% tolerance for 
all tariff lines instead of 10% and an exclusion of access to the tolerance rule for 
chapters 50 to 63 which cover textiles and apparel (T&A) for the group of 92 GSP-
eligible countries).   
 
Third, as can be seen from Table 2 and Figure 1, utilization rates do not rise 
monotonically with preference margins, as one would expect. Indeed, utilization rates 
fall as preference margins increase for NAFTA and also for the GSP-eligible countries 
over a certain range. This is due to a composition effect. In the T&A sector where 
preference margins are around or above 10%, utilization rates are low.  However. 
GSP-eligible countries get much less preferential access than ACP countries in the 
T&A sector (see Table 3b). Since these sectors are characterized by specific 
manufacturing requirements, lobbying activities by the domestic industries in the 
high-income partner influence the specification of the rules, and the utilization rates 
are low even though preferential margins are high.7  Based on an analysis of 
utilization rate in that sector for NAFTA, Anson et al. (2005) and Cadot et al. (2005 
and 2006a), conclude that the PSRO requirements in that sector were designed to 
leave Mexican exporters on their ‘participation constraint’, i.e. leaving only marginal 
rents for Mexican exporters.  
 
Are these utilization rates low? Certainly not by AFTA standards which show 
utilization rates in the 5%-10% range for the late 1990s for the Philippines, the 
country with the highest preference utilization rate (see Baldwin (2006), Figure 5). 
Baldwin argues that this is because the bulk of intra-ASEAN trade is in the 
computer/machinery (HS-84) and electrical equipment (HS-85) sectors where 
preferential access market is negligible. However, the use of a VC criterion could also 
contribute to this low rate of utilization of preferences even if at first sight meeting 
this requirement would not appear to be too difficult since most parts are indeed 
                     
5 For example, under NAFTA certification is carried out by the private sector and does not have to be 
carried out for each transaction, whereas under PANEURO regime there is a double certification 
method (private and public) for each transaction.  See Estevadeordal and Suominen (2006) for further 
discussion and comparison of certification methods across PTAs. 
6 Of the 78 ACP countries, 41 qualify for Everything But Arms (EBA) status which gave these countries 
virtually duty-free access to the EU market. However, in 2004, most ACP countries qualifying for EBA 
status continued to request ACP status. Hence when we speak of ACP countries, we refer to the 78 ACP 
countries. 
7 Brenton and Imagawa (2005, Box 9.2, p. 20) mention a particularly egregious case in which NAFTA’s 
RoOs for apparel specify that imported fabric must be “of subheading 511111 or 511119, if hand-woven, 
with a loom width of less than 76cm, woven in the United Kingdom in accordance with the rules and 
regulations of the Harris Tweed Association, Ltd, and so certified by the Association”. Such specific 
rules, which clearly smack of firm-specific lobbying are, however, relatively uncommon.    6
produced in the region, at least for the computer hard-disk example shown in his 
Figure 8. However, the very high import content of exports for the Asia region shown 
in Figure 2  suggest that AFTA utilization rates could be low under the present VC 
limit.  
 
To drive home the importance of trade in intermediates, consider the following 
example recalling that Japan is not currently a member of AFTA. According to the 
Asian input-output data provided in Baldwin (2006, Table 1), for all the middle-
income countries (Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand), on average 35%- 40% 
of intermediates are sourced from outside the AFTA group. Take then an activity with 
a 10% value-added (this value-added Figure is consistent with the deepening of inter-
industry flows) and 40% intermediates non-originating. Then, originating value for 
this activity would be, 64%. But for activities where 60% of materials would be non-
originating, originating value would fall to 46%, barely above the stipulated 40% 
minimum requirement stipulated under AFTA. One might also note that, in the case 
of the EU, the preference rate for tariff lines where a value-content only criterion is 
used is lower than for the other tariff lines (see Table 5) . 
 
Returning to the EU and US PTAs, the rather low utilization rates for relatively high 
preference margins suggests that restrictive PRSO could be the culprit. Indeed, it 
could well be that more restrictive PSRO are applied to the tariff lines with the 
highest preferential margins.  To see if this is the case, we use an ordinal 
restrictiveness index that takes values in the range 17 i r ≤ ≤  with increasing values 
corresponding to a more restrictive rule.8  Though not amenable to quantification like 
effective rates of protection, the R-index is intended to play the same role as an 
effective rate of protection: indicate the restrictiveness that must be met by a product 
to obtain originating status.  Table 3a shows that tariff lines with tariff peaks (tariffs 
lines three times or more the average tariff) that is tariff lines where preferential 
margins are the highest do indeed have a higher value for the R-index than those with 
low tariffs. This is the case for both NAFTA and the EU.   
 
The conclusion from this first look at preferential margins and utilization rates is 
that, even for non-negligible preferences, utilization rates can be quite low, and that 
PSRO are, at least partly, designed to discourage the use of preferences. This is 
particularly true for the T&A sector where multiple criteria are the norm. 
 
Once more, one might ask how relevant these observations are for AFTA. At this stage 
almost all intra-ASEAN trade is in ‘middle-products’ (see Sanyal and Jones (1982),  
the final product being sold to the outside world. But the picture would change rather 
dramatically with the proposed FTAs between Japan and AFTA members and 
between Korea and other AFTA members. Then, the resulting pattern of trade would 
be closer to the one currently observed between the US and the EU and their 
Southern trading partners. Here, differences in endowments matter with the 
                     
8 The index was first proposed by Estevadeordal (2000) for NAFTA. The construction of the R-index 
is illustrated in the appendix and discussed in further detail in Cadot et al. (2006).  In addition to the 
inevitable arbitrariness involved in setting up the observation rule, the R-index has other 
shortcomings. In particular, it does not control for the degree of preferences and for the characteristics 
of the different activities: satisfying a CTC involving a CH for intermediate activities is likely to be 
easier than if it is to be satisfied for a final good activity.  Finally, it is an ordinal rather than cardinal 
measure. For a description of some of the shortcomings of the R-index, see Erasmus et al. (2006).   7
resulting pattern of trade being of the inter-industry rather than intra-industry 
pattern. As soon as inter-industry trade involves the sourcing of a fraction of 
intermediates from the outside world and there is potential for regional trade in the 
final product (e.g. in apparel and other light industry products), the experience of the 
EU and US becomes relevant.    
 
East Asian trade has grown remarkably rapidly in the last 15 years through the 
breaking up of the manufacturing process  or the ‘slicing up of the value chain’. With 
tariff cuts on a discriminatory basis in the China-ASEAN FTA and the Japan-ASEAN 
bilaterals on the table, tensions are likely to appear in the region. One likely element 
of these tensions will be the negotiation over Rules of Origin (RoO).   
 
So why are RoO in AFTA apparently less stringent than elsewhere? First, until 
recently Asian regionalism has been more about cooperation than about preferential 
trade (APEC under the aegis of the US was specifically set up to avoid preferential 
trade and the formation of an ‘Asian trade bloc’), with much of the Region’s 
integration in the world economy driven by unilateral tariff reductions. Second, much 
of the regional trade has been part of the development of the ‘Asian manufacturing 
matrix’ whereby the labor-intensive stages of production initially carried out in Japan 
and then Korea have been outsourced to the lower-wage countries in the region for 
final exporting to the EU and US markets. In this unusual set-up relative to the other 
global trading patterns, intra-regional trade in politically sensitive final products 
where protection is highest was insignificant. Hence, the political-economy forces 
that would usually lead to lobbying activity resulting in the complex RoO observed 
elsewhere was not observed.  
 
3. The Economics of RoO 
 
RoO are often justified as an instrument to promote industrialization in low-income 
countries (or value-added-generating activities). In fact, they impose costs on the 
intended beneficiaries of preferences.  In addition, contrary to what is claimed, rather 
than help countries industrialize, they end up suppressing trade, an effect that could 
be particularly important in AFTA countries where much fractionalization of 
production takes place (Erasmus et al. (2006) provide vivid examples based on case 
studies in SADC where RoO have been claimed to be a development tool for low-
income members).  
 
The suppression effect of RoO can be easily visualized if one considers that the 
production of a final product involves a continuum of activities, with the range of 
activities being ordered in decreasing labor-intensity. For example the sowing of 
buttons on a shirt could take place in low-income Cambodia, the weaving in 
Indonesia, the production of yarn in Indonesia. Then imposing a minimum regional 
VC would suppress trade with the outside partner (Bangladesh) and redirect 
investments to the region. As a result, production costs would increase and efficiency 
would fall.  
 
Below we present a general decomposition formula of the costs of RoO using a 
minimum VC. This decomposition motivates the review of evidence that follows and 
serves a justification for the new estimates presented in section 4. 
    8
3.1 The Costs of RoO: a decomposition 
 
Suppose that a producer in the Philippines wishes to sell a shirt,  i X ,  under 
preferential access in another AFTA member, Thailand.  This shirt is produced with 
‘originating’ intermediate goods (i.e. with intermediates  from other AFTA members 
and from domestic sources), 
o
j Z , but also with inputs from non-originating sources,  
N
j Z , say from Bangladesh or India. Let i stand for the shirt and  j  for the 
intermediates, say textiles. Omit any taxes paid domestically, and label each input 
with its own price since intermediates are differentiated products.  Let   i VA  represent 
the payments to labor (and to capital or profits). Then the value of final sales is 
broken down between payments to value added and to intermediate products: 
 
  OO NN
ii i j j j j P XV AP Z P Z =+ +  (0.1) 
 
To obtain originating status, intermediate purchases from domestic producers of 
textiles and from textile producers in the regional partner countries are counted as 
‘originating’ i.e.  OO
jj P Z  counts as regional value-added.  Then, unrestricted 
originating value-added expressed as a percent of unit sale (evaluated at FOB prices 
in the case of AFTA) is given by the expression: 
 
  ( )
* / OO
ii j j i i va VA P Z P X =+  (0.2) 
 
Now assume that to satisfy origin requirements to sell under preferential status in 
Thailand, the producer in the Philippines is forced to source more originating inputs 
than he would under optimal circumstances (i.e. in the absence of the PSRO). If we 
let an “*” denote the initial unconstrained (i.e. optimal) choice, and a “c” a 
constrained choice, then modeling the effects of a binding value content boils down 
to modeling the implications of: 
 
  * c
ii va va >  (0.3) 
 
In the case of AFTA,   ( ) 40%
C
i va ≥  is the uniform criterion used to qualify for 
originating status (although producers also have the option of using other qualifying 
requirements, notably in the T&A sector where the alternative PSRO were used 
because the value-content rule was found to be too restrictive). 
 
Figure 3, adapted from Krishna (2006) shows the costs implications of forcing a 
producer to use more originating inputs than he would otherwise. Assume a 
competitive environment with a constant- returns-to- scale technology where the 
producer who takes his cost-minimizing decision on the basis of given prices. When 
he is unconstrained in his purchase of intermediates, (i.e. when 
( )
* / ROW AFTA z ZZ z ≡= ), his unit costs are given by  0 cc = . When he is constrained (i.e. 
when  C zz = ), his unit costs are higher and given by  1 cc = .   9
 
Being forced to use a greater share of originating inputs is equivalent to forcing him 
physically to use a greater proportion of originating intermediates. As a result his 
unit costs of production increase to c1. Let  D
i c ( )
10
ii cc = − be the cost induced by this 
distortion.   
 
To this, one must add administrative costs,  A
i c .  Though not shown in Figure 3 to 
save space, it would be easy to do so in a similar framework by reinterpreting the 
isoquant as an isovalue (i.e. it is drawn to reflect a constant value of output). Let then 
* 1 ii PP ==  and choose the constant value,  0
i v  so that   0* 1 ii i vP X = = . With zero profits, 
unit costs will equal unit value ( )
00
ii v c =  and the producer will produce  1
i X =  in 
equilibrium.  With the product price unchanged, the effect of an increase in unit 
production costs is to make the producer unprofitable, unless he is compensated by 
sufficient preferential market access.  
 
Finally, consider rents and market power. Recent estimates reviewed below also 
indicate that only a fraction of the rent associated with market access accrues to 
exporters and that the share of rents they receive is lessened by the presence of RoO. 
Call the loss of rent transfer associated with RoO,  i μ . Then per unit production cost 
in the presence of RoO will  be the sum of costs in the absence of RoO and 
compliance costs,  C
i c : 
 
  00 D AC
iii i iii ccc c cc μ = +++ = +  (0.4) 
 
Under these conditions, the Philippine producer can either export to Thailand under 
the Common Preferential Extended Tariff (CPET) scheme where the preferential 















or under MFN status. Under MFN status, unit price will be 1 and under preferences, 
1 i τ + . Since unit profits are given by  ii i P c π = − , if  i u  denotes whether or not CPET 















< ++ ⇒ =
 (0.5) 
In practice, many heterogeneous firms export at the HS-8 level.  Thus one will 
observe a distribution of utilization rates at the most disaggregated HS-8 level. Since 
there is no data to match firms with utilization rates, the estimation of utilization 
rates and their correlates in effect assumes that all firms exporting at the HS-8 level 
are in effect, identical. This evidence is now reviewed. 
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3.2. Evidence on the Costs of RoO 
 
It is difficult to estimate the costs associated with RoO because these costs are not 
observable. Estimating the costs of RoO is further complicated by the fact that, with 
the exception of the estimates presented in section 4 below, all econometric 
estimates so far have been obliged to rely on dummy variables to capture the 
presence of a RoO requirement (i.e. one can only note the presence or the absence of, 
say, an exception or a technical requirement). Finally, data on utilization rates are 
only available for NAFTA (and more recently for the EU preferential schemes). As a 
result, statistical evidence relates to the EU and US schemes, and furthermore it is 




Most of the evidence rests on isolating the effects of various PSRO criteria on 
utilization after controlling for the influence of preferential margins. Carrère and de 
Melo (2006)  assume that the utilization of preferences for product line i is a positive 
function of the difference between the tariff preference margin , i τ , and (unobserved) 
total compliance costs,  i c  (expressed as a percentage of unit price)  associated with 
applying the RoO criteria. That is they suppose that.  ' () ; ( . ) 0 ii i uf c f τ = −> , and 
that  ()
'(.) 0 ii cg R o O g => . These assumptions lead to an estimable relation of the 
form:  
 
ii i k i k k uR o O λ ατ θ ε =+ + + ∑ %  (0.6) 
 
where  ik Roo is a vector of dummy variables capturing the presence of PSRO (technical 
requirements, change of tariff classifications, exceptions). Results from estimating 
(0.6) on data from NAFTA by the authors (and by Cadot et al. (2006a) for the EU)  
indicates that utilization rates are positively related to preferential margins, and 
negatively to the presence of PSRO.  Carrère and de Melo combined their estimates 
with R-index values to compute an estimated ad-valorem equivalent of total RoO 
compliance costs (administrative and due to higher input costs). Their estimates 
range from 3.5% for a change of chapter to over 15% for combinations of RoOs 
involving technical requirements.  
 
Even if the estimates point in the same direction, it is difficult to gather a sense of 
robustness from estimates derived from a relation like (0.6). The reason is that 
there is so much heterogeneity and unobservables influencing preference uptake that 
estimates are quite sensitive to the inclusion of dummy variables controls (this is 
especially the case for estimates based on GSP preferences extended by the EU to 
many trading partners).  
 
This said, all estimates point in the same direction. When multiple criteria are used to 
determine origin, utilization rates are, ceteris paribus lower. Moreover, results based 
on estimates regressing utilization rates on dummy variables capturing the presence 
of different types of PSRO, suggest that technical requirements tend to be associated 
with high compliance costs, whereas changes of tariff classification, even at high   11
degrees of aggregation (like a change of chapter) do not seem to have comparably 
strong effects. Of course these suggestive conclusions must be taken very cautiously 
as these instruments are in most cases used in combination with each other and their 
effects are only captured by dummy variables, making it difficult to draw inferences 
on their individual effects. However they are consistent with the casual observation 
that technical requirements can be easily manipulated by special interests, and 
suggest that broad reliance on a change of tariff classification as a one-size-fits-all 




An alternative to the above is to use the R-index to carry out a non-parametric 
estimation of upper and lower bound estimates following inspiration from early work 
by Herin (1986) for EFTA. Table 4 summarizes the results of an exercise in Cadot et 
al. (2006b). By revealed preference, for headings with  100% i u = , the average 
preference margin,  i τ , is an upper-bound,  C
U c , for compliance costs (as 
C
i c cannot be 
greater than the preferential margin,  i τ ). Likewise, for headings with  0% i u = , the 
preference margin gives a lower-bound estimate,  C
L c . For the remaining sectors with 
0% 100% i u << , assumptions must be made. One could argue that, heterogeneity of 
firms notwithstanding, firms would be indifferent to exporting under the preferential 
regime. Then, an approximation of compliance costs would be given by the average 
rate of tariff preference computed for the remaining sectors, i.e. on the sample 
0% 100% i u << . Applying this reasoning, we obtain the estimates in rows 1-3 in Table 
4.  
 
The R-index can then be used to breakdown the administrative cost component in 
total compliance costs. Ignore rents, i.e. ( ) 0 i μ =  so that total compliance costs,  C c , 
are given by  CDA
iii ccc =+ , both expressed as a percentage of unit price.  Assume that 
administrative costs would be negligible for firms on their participation constraint, 
i.e. for (0% 100% i u << ), provided that firms would also be confronted with low 
values of  i r  , i.e. values corresponding to a change of tariff classification at the 
subheading level, CS. This corresponds to  2 ≤ i r  (not much paperwork is involved in 
"proving" a change of subheading). Hence, calculating preference margins for 
utilization rates close to 100% (say  95% i u =  or  90% i u =  to be on the safe side 
when  2 ≤ i r ), gives an upper bound of the distortionary component,  D
i c  . These 
estimates are given in row 7. 
 
As noted by Cadot et al., the rather large differences between the PANEURO and 
NAFTA estimates, especially when using unweighted data, suggest caution in 
interpreting these estimates since too much weight is probably given to outlier 
observations with small trade volumes.  Nonetheless, the higher estimates for the EU 
are coherent with likely higher administrative costs (perhaps associated with 
certification), and ultimately with lower utilization rates.  
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The estimates in Table 4 indicate the difficulty of coming up with plausible estimates 
of the costs of RoO, whether one relies on parametric or non-parametric methods. 
For example, how should one interpret the number of requests for preferential status 
in rows 8 and 9 when tariff preferences are nil? Negligible administrative costs?. Or if 
administrative costs are non-negligible, then neither should one observe requests for 
preferential status when preferential margins are low, here assumed to be  3% i τ = .9 
In any case, even if there is much heterogeneity in the data, administrative costs are 
not negligible, justifying the proposal to do away with origin requirements for 




To get a handle on the welfare effects of RoO, one has to factor in the rent element 
associated with preferences and their distribution between the exporting and 
importing country. This implies estimating the pass-through effect of tariffs on 
consumer prices (i.e. the extent to which preferences translate into a higher producer 
price for exporters). Olarreaga and Özden (2005) for AGOA preferences, and Özden 
and Sharma (2006) for CARICOM preferences estimate that between one-third and 
one half of tariff reductions are passed on to producers. However, part of the border 
price increase could just reflect an increase in the complying costs discussed above. 
Cadot et al. (2005) link the pass-through effects of preferences to Mexican producers 
in the Textiles & Apparel sector under NAFTA directly to rules of origin, and show 
that once one takes into account RoO, the pass-through effect falls from 80% to 
about 50%. They also show that US producers of intermediates are able to retain a 
substantial share of the rents generated by Mexican tariff preferences.  They 
conclude that in North-South PTAs where the preferential margin in the Northern 
partner are rather low, it is likely that RoO are less a development tool to prevent 
screwdriver assembly than a circuitous way of raising the profits of upstream 
producers  by creating a captive market for them in partner countries. 
 
At this stage, AFTA integration has been mostly geared towards supplying products 
to the outside world, so the rent transfer associated with preferential access has not 
been an issue. However, as preferential access is bound to increase with the current 
FTAs under negotiation involving Japan and Korea with AFTA members, 
protectionist pressures will increase. A pattern of vertical trade along the lines 
described here would then be likely to emerge between the richer and poorer 
members in the PTA and the distribution of rents might be mostly tilted towards the 
more developed partner.  
 
4. Value Content Rules and Preference Utilization: Estimates from the EU 
Preferential Market Schemes 
 
Currently AFTA has a VC rule. How restrictive is this rule, and how might utilization 
rates react to a change in the VC rate from the current maximum limit of 60% for 
non-originating imports to a lower (or higher) rate? We draw here on the EU data to 
estimate what these effects might be. As explained below, because of the great 
                     
9 Using threshold estimation techniques, Manchin (2004) estimates for the same data that 
preferential status is not asked when  34 % i τ − <    13
heterogeneity in the data, we confine our estimates to tariff lines that rely on a VC 
rate as the only PSRO.  
 
Table 5 describes the distribution of the minimum local value content10 when this 
criterion is applied along with the distribution of minimum threshold values. 
Currently minimum originating value ranges from 50% to 85%.11  There is bunching 
around the 60% value but there is still some variation in VC rates across tariff lines, 
giving hope that the data will enable identification of the effects of variations in VC 
rates on utilization rates. The Table shows that utilization rates are usually higher for 
ACP than for GSP, with large variations in utilization rates in spite of relatively small 
variations in preferential margins that are quite low. For AFTA, the closest VC rate is 
the 50% RVC rate where the utilization rate is around 40% for a preferential margin 
of 2.6%.  
 
Following the discussion in section 3.1, assume that the profit rate for product line i,  
i π  is an increasing function of the preferential margin,  i τ , and a decreasing value of 
the originating value content,  i vc ,: 
 
  01 1 ii i i vc π αα τβ ε = ++ +  (0.7) 
 
where the anticipated signs for the parameters or interest are:  11 0; 0 αβ >< % % . There is 
no observable measure of this benefit, so it is a “latent variable”. What is observed 
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for some function f and bounds  0 π  and  1 π . These bounds, which are not known, can 
be thought of as values of the preferential treatment’s net benefit that are respectively 
so low ( 0 π ), and so high ( 1 π ), that all firms (heterogeneity across firms is ignored) in 
the sector end up making the same decision (using or not using the preferential 
treatment). For simplicity, assume a linear form for f, so that  i u follows (0.7) in the 
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10 In fact, under the current PSRO, the criterion is specified as maximum non-originating imports 
expressed as a percentage of the ‘ex-works factory price’, i.e. of unit price at the factory. Since the EU is 
currently considering a move towards a simplification of RoO procedures that might result in a single 
criterion requiring a minimum originating value, we have expressed here this criterion in terms of 
minimum originating value. 
11 For the wholly obtained criterion, originating value has to be 100%. Since this criterion only applies 




i u  is the latent utilization rate and  i u is the observed one.  
 
Turning to the estimation of (0.9), to avoid giving excessive weight to tariff lines with 
small trade flows, tariff preferences were aggregated using imports as weights from 
the HS-8 to the HS-6 level where the value content rates are specified. In addition, to 
minimize measurement error, we took an average of utilization rates over the whole 
period for which data were available (2002 to 2004) and we considered separately 
GSP (including EBA) beneficiaries and ACP beneficiaries because of the 
systematically differential utilization rates detected in Table 2 and Figure 1.  As 
mentioned above, to reduce the effects of omitted variable bias, we only considered 
tariff lines where VC was the only criterion used. Again, this would correspond most 
closely to the current RoO in Asian PTAs. Finally because of administrative costs, we 
also restricted our estimates to tariff lines with preferential margins in excess of 2% 
or 5%.  
 
The results appear in Table 6.  The overall fit for the models summarized in the 
likelihood-ratio values are reasonable (see row 6).  Average estimated values for 
preferences rates appear in row 9 and for utilization rates in row 10. Note that the 
utilization rates are low for these tariff lines, suggesting that value content criteria are 
rather restrictive. Estimated utilization rates are slightly higher for GSP-eligible 
countries than for ACP countries. Since estimates are influenced by omitted variables, 
it is best not to speculate on this small difference in utilization rates across samples. 
 
Turning to the estimates of the individual variables, all signs of estimated coefficients 
are as expected.  Estimates in columns 1 and 4 are carried over the whole sample, 
with the other columns referring to separate estimates for GSP and ACP recipients. 
Since the variable entered for the VC is the minimum regional value content, the 
negative sign estimate indicates that, as expected,  a higher minimum regional value 
content lowers utilization rates.    
 
Since coefficients derived from a Tobit estimation indicate the expected marginal 
effect of the coefficients on the latent utilization rate, 
*
i u , we computed the expected 
marginal effect of the VC on the observed utilization rates, i u 12. Row 8 translates this 
estimate into a corresponding change in the estimated utilization rate for a reduction 
in the maximum regional content from 60% to 50%. For example, in the case of the 
GSP estimates in column 2, this reduction would raise the estimated utilization rate 
by 2.5 percentage point (row 8 column 2) from the estimated average of 16.7 percent.  
The corresponding estimate for the ACP grouping is 8.2 percentage points, an 
estimate on the high side since it predicts that the utilization rate by more than 50%.  
 
                     
12 Tobit coefficients are the expected marginal effects of the coefficients on the unobserved  *
i u . Unlike 
in the classical linear model, they cannot be interpreted directly.  Instead, expected marginal effects on 
the observed 
i u  must be calculated by correcting the tobit coefficients for the censorship. For 
continuous regressors, the marginal effects are the Tobit function’s derivatives and thus give the effect 
of infinitesimal increases in regressors on the dependent variable. For a binary regressor (dummy 
variable), the marginal effect gives the effect on the dependent variable of an increase from zero to one 
in the regressor. Because of the Tobit’s nonlinearity, marginal effects vary with the level of all 
regressors. By convention, they are estimated at their mean values.  
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The last three columns report results for a smaller sample including only tariff lines 
with preference rates exceeding 5%. While the pattern of signs is unchanged, 
coefficient values often vary by a large margin, suggesting that the estimates are not 
very stable. Concentrating on the estimated effects of a change in the maximum 
regional content from 60% to 50%, one gets the plausible result that utilization rates 
are less sensible to a change value content rate at tariff lines with higher preference 
rates. 
 
As a final exercise, the bottom of the Table estimates what utilization rates would be 
for preferential rates in ACFTA. Chinese and Philippine average MFN tariff rates (row 
13 and 15) are used to proxy for the extent of likely preferential market access for 
ASEAN exports into China and the Philippines, or vice-versa. In this illustrative 
simulations, the VC is set to the AFTA level (40% in row 12), which is likely to be the 
VC rate under ACFTA.  Results of this simulation are reported on rows 14 (China) and 
16 (Philippines) at the bottom of Table 6.  As expected, predicted utilization rates are 
higher when using the Chinese MFN tariff, which is more than twice higher than the 
Philippine one.  
 
Because of the very different pattern of trade between the EU and its GSP and ACP 
partners and the ruling patterns of trade in AFTA, it is difficult to conclude whether 
these ex-ante simulated utilization rate responses to changes in VC and in 
preferential margins could be used as guides to the likely effects under AFTA.  
Furthermore, the estimated coefficients values are sensitive to the choice of controls, 
and the estimates were only carried over the sample of tariff lines where the VC was 
the only criterion used to determine origin.  Therefore, it is probably best to retain 
from the exercise that utilization rates could be quite sensitive to changes in VC 
requirements and preferential margins. 
 
 5.  Lessons from NAFTA and the EU PTAs 
 
In any preferential trading arrangement (PTA) short of a Customs Union, RoO are 
necessary to prevent trade deflection. Typically, the vast majority of PTAs use three 
methods to establish if sufficient transformation or substantial transformation has 
taken place: (i) change of tariff classification; (ii) a critical threshold for value-added; 
and (iii) specific manufacturing processes. The EU and the US use these three 
methods often relying on multiple requirements at the product level.  Taken together, 
the evidence from the US and EU experience suggests that RoO have indeed 
restricted access because RoO have been designed to protect sectors in the EU and 
the US that would be most affected by preferences.  Overall, RoO have been more 
restrictive than would have been necessary to satisfy the sufficient transformation 
criterion, with as a consequence low utilization rates in sectors like T&A where 
preferential margins were usually high.  
 
The more detailed evidence on the costs of the PSRO in NAFTA and the EU suggests 
that administrative costs are likely to be non-negligible (though one observes positive 
imports in tariff lines with zero or small tariff preferences). Distortionary costs 
created by RoO have even proven harder to quantify, although the low rates of 
utilization in the textiles and apparel sector attest to their presence. Econometric 
evidence also shows that, after controlling for the preference margin, utilization rates 
are lower in sectors characterized by multiple RoO requirements. The econometric 
evidence also suggests that in the textiles & apparel sector where vertical linkages are   16
important, RoO reduce substantially the rent transfer towards exporters which are 
intended by preferences in the first place. Thus, North-South PTAs, which correspond 
to those currently under negotiation in the ASEAN, are likely to yield negligible 
benefits for the low-income partners. 
 
Using a large sample of tariff lines where the sole criterion used was a value content 
(VC) criterion, the paper estimated utilization rates as a function of preferential 
margins and VC rates.  The results of the estimation show that higher regional VC 
rates are indeed associated with lower utilization rates after controlling for the effects 
of preferential margins on the utilization rate. A reduction in the regional value 
content from 60% to 40% is estimated to increase utilization rates by between 2 and 
8 percentage points.  If the many uncontrolled other factors influencing utilization 
rates were the same under the AFTA agreements than under the EU GSP and ACP 
PTAs,  then the current 40% VC rate might give rise to a utilization rate between 20% 
and 40% depending on the extent of preferential margins. 
 
On the basis of this evidence, this paper has argued that forthcoming regional PTAs 
in Asia (e.g. ACFTA, Japan-ASEAN and ASEAN_Korea) could well face pressures for 
shifting to the complex criteria characterizing the EU and US PTAs. These pressures 
should be resisted, and the ASEAN regional trading agreements under negotiation 
should stick to the relatively simple current rule requiring a non-originating import 
content of less than 60% or less of the FOB price of the product under what is in 
effect full cumulation.  If this transparent rule is potentially costly for small firms in 
poor countries because of its requirements in terms of accounting, it has the 
advantage of being unambiguous, it bypasses the need for Product-specific Rules of 
Origin (PSRO) and does not give leeway to lobbying activities by domestic industries 
over the specification of rules.   
 





A Comparison of NAFTA and PANEURO rules of Origin13 
 
Virtually all PTAs have regime-wide RoO and Product-specific rules of origin (PSRO). 
We describe briefly those rules in the case of NAFTA and PANEURO, the two leading 
countries involved in PTAs. We describe first regime-wide rules, then the PSRO and 
how these were mapped into the synthetic R-index used in the text. 
 
Regime-wide rules. These usually include: (i) a de minimis (or tolerance) criterion 
which stipulates a maximum percentage of non-originating materials that can be 
used without affecting the origin of the final product; (ii) cumulation14; (iii) roll-up15; 
(iv) duty-drawback16;(v) certification method. How these regime-wide rules differ 
between NAFTA, PANEURO (the single list applying to all EU PTAs) and a selection 
of other PTAs including AFTA is described in Table A1. 
 
Table A1 describes the regime-wide RoO for a representative selection of PTAs. 
Column 1 shows that virtually all PTAs require PSRO. These typically involve, among 
others, a change of tariff classification (CTC) that can take place at different levels 
(see Table A2). AFTA here stands out as the exception since it does not use a CTC to 
confer origin. Like all PTAs, AFTA relies on a regional value content (RVC) criterion. 
Compared with others, the criterion is relatively lenient. Note also that most PTAs 
rely on specific manufacturing processes (also known as technical requirements) 
which apply mostly to trade in textiles and apparel. So far, since most of the 
                     
13 This appendix draws on Cadot et al. (2006a). 
14 Cumulation allows PTA producers to import non-originating materials from other PTA member 
countries without affecting the final product’s originating status. Three types of cumulation rules are 
distinguished: bilateral, diagonal and full cumulation. Bilateral cumulation is most common and 
applies to trade between two partners in a PTA. It stipulates that producers in country A can use inputs 
from country B without affecting the final good’s originating status provided that the inputs are 
themselves originating (i.e. provided that they themselves satisfy the area’s RoOs). Under diagonal 
cumulation (the basic principle of the EU’s PANEURO system and under AFTA), countries tied by the 
same PTA can use materials that originate in any member country as if the materials were originating 
in the country where the processing is undertaken. Finally, under full cumulation, all stages of 
processing or transformation of a product within the PTA can be counted as qualifying content 
regardless of whether the processing is sufficient to confer originating status to the materials 
themselves. It is easy to show that full cumulation allows for greater fragmentation of the production 
process than the more commonly used bilateral and diagonal cumulation, and hence is less restrictive. 
15 The absorption or roll-up principle allows non-originating materials which have acquired origin by 
meeting specific processing requirements to maintain this origin when used as input in a subsequent 
transformation. In other words, the non-originating materials are no longer taken into account in 
calculating value added. The roll-up or absorption principle is used in most PTAs (in particular the 
EU’s GSP and Cotonou), although a few have exceptions for the automotive sector.  
 
16 Duty drawbacks are refunds to exporters of tariffs paid on imported intermediate inputs. Many 
PTAs, especially in the Americas, mandate the elimination of duty-drawback schemes for exports to 
partner countries, on the ground that a duty drawback claimed by a producer in A to export to B would 
put that producer at a competitive advantage compared to domestic producers in B given that the A-
producer already benefits from the elimination of intra-bloc tariffs. The elimination of duty drawbacks 
as part of a PTA’s formation can imply a cut in the profitability of final-good assembly for export to 
partner countries in the area, although tariff escalation, when present, already provides some 
protection for final-assembly operations (as it implies lower tariffs on intermediate goods than on final 
ones).   18
production in textiles and apparel in Asia is directed towards the rest-of-the-world, 
this criterion has understandably not made its appearance. Finally, again with the 
exception of AFTA, all PTAs have a tolerance limit (i.e. a percentage of imported 
inputs that are not counted as non-originating) and an absorption rule.17 
 
Product-specific rules (PSRO). Besides regime-wide RoO, PSROs determine 
eligibility at the tariff-line level.18 Two basic criteria are used to determine origin: the 
"wholly obtained" (WH) and "substantial transformation" criteria. The first criterion 
applies mainly to products which have been entirely grown, extracted from the soil or 
harvested within the country of export, or manufactured there from any of these 
products. Therefore it applies when only one country enters into consideration in 
attributing origin.  
 
The second criterion, “substantial transformation”, is more complex and is used for 
all tariff lines representing products with processing. It involves either of the 
following alternatives (which can be used as stand-alone but usually in combination 
with each other):  
 
•  Change of Tariff Classification (CTC), requiring the product to belong to a 
tariff classification different from that of its imported inputs. The change of 
tariff classification can be expressed at various levels of aggregation: from 
broader to narrower, chapter (HS 2 digits), heading (HS 4 digits), subheading 
(HS 6 digits), or item (HS 8 digits). Changes of classification expressed at 
broader levels of aggregation are, in principle, more constraining.19  
•  Regional Value Content (VC) requirement, requiring the product either to 
acquire a minimum percentage of local value added in the exporting country or 
not to exceed a maximum percentage of foreign (non-originating) materials. 
The VC criterion is largely used by the EU, but not much by the US. 
•  Technical Requirement (TECH), requiring the product to undergo certain 
manufacturing operations in the exporting country or prohibiting the use of 
certain inputs. 
•  Exceptions (EXC) can be attached to a particular CTC, which prohibits the use 
of non-originating materials from a certain subheading, heading, or chapter. 
•  Allowances, on the contrary, permit the use of non-originating materials from 
certain classifications. 
 
The complexity of regime-wide rules is extended to the PSRO. Table A2 describes the 
PSRO for NAFTA and for all the EU PTAs.  The criteria correspond to those described 
                     
17 The PTAs also differ in the way certification is carried out (either single or double certification and 
either public or private with the option that in some cases such as NAFTA certification needs only be 
carried out for one shipment rather than all shipments. 
18 The Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, commonly known as "HS 
Nomenclature", is an international multipurpose nomenclature elaborated under the auspices of the 
World Customs Organization. Although only 116 countries are Contracting Parties to this Convention, 
more than 190 administrations worldwide apply the US nomenclature, mostly to set up their national 
customs tariff and for the collection of economic statistical data. The HS Nomenclature comprises 20 
sections further subdivided into 96 chapters (commodity group identified by 2-digit code). Chapters 
are subdivided into headings (4-digit codes) and subheadings (6-digit codes, about 5000 of them), 
where the harmonization stops. Some administrations such as Eurostat use finer (up to 10 digits) 
classifications. 
  
19 Examples of required changes of tariff classification are given in Annex 2.   19
in Table 1 in the text, but it is completed by the value attached to the R-index in the 
last column. The third column gives the value of a restrictiveness index ri, (1≤ri≤7) for 
each type of restriction which is then used to construct an overall index or 
restrictiveness for the regime (R-index). It is this ordinal index that is used in the 
discussion in section 2. 
 
In brief, the “observation rule” is based on the following two assumptions. The first is 
that the restrictiveness of a change of Tariff Classification (CTC)  can be ranked in 
terms of its restrictiveness on the basis of the following observation: A change of 
classification at the chapter level (CC) has to be more difficult to satisfy than a change 
at the Heading (CH) level; likewise, a change at the heading level has to be stricter 
than at the subheading (CS) level, and a change at the subheading level more 
stringent than at the tariff line or item level (CI). This implies that the following 
observation rule (larger values corresponding to more restrictiveness): 
 
CC CH CS CI Δ> Δ> Δ> Δ  
 
The second assumption is that more criteria usually imply a more restrictive rule. 
Thus, if a CTC is widely used in both NAFTA and PANEURO, in the majority of cases, 
it is almost always accompanied by other criteria to be met to confer origin. All but 
allowances make it more difficult to satisfy origin, so the observation rule assigns 
higher values to the index resulting from the CTC when these other requirements are 
added on (and a lower value when there is an allowance). Further details on the 
construction of the R-index (computed for 3’555 tariff lines for NAFTA and 5’595 
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 NAF.  PAN.  NAF.  PAN.  NAF.  PAN.  NAF.  PAN.  NAF.  PAN. NAF. PAN.  NAF.  PAN. 
                         
No CTC  0.5 0.6 0.0 2.6 0.0  13.0  0.0 0.2  0.0  8.1 0.0 7.0  0.5  31.5 
CI 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 
CS 3.8  0.1  0.4  0.0  0.1  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1 0.0 0.4  4.4  1.0 
CH 36.3  16.5  0.2 7.8 4.1  12.8  0.1 0.1  0.0  0.3 0.0 13.9 40.7  51.3 
CC 48.7  0.0  5.8 7.3 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.2 54.4  7.7 
Altern.                     8.7  0.0  8.7 
Total 89.3 17.2 6.4 17.7  4.2 26.1 0.1  0.4  0.0  8.5 0.0  30.1 100 100 
 
Notes: 
Classification is carried out at the HS-6 tariff line level (#5595 lines for the EU and # 3995 for 
NAFTA). Each cell is the percentage of tariff lines that have the RoO in the corresponding row and in 
the corresponding column. 
CTC = change in tariff classification with CC = Change in Chapter / CH = Change in Heading / CS  = 
Change in Subheading / CI = Change in Item; 
EXC = Exception to change of tariff classification;  
VC = Regional Value Content;  TECH = Technical Requirement. 
Altern. = Lines for which importers can choose between alternative criteria. 
Source: Cadot et al. (2006a),  Table 2 
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a    () ( ) /1
MFN PREF PREF
ii i i tt t τ =− + is the preference margin. 
b Computed at the HS-8 tariff line level for GSP and ACP. 
c Computed at the HS-6 tariff line level for NAFTA. 
d  Number of tariff lines between brackets. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations  
 
 
Table 3:  Protection, the PSRO Restrictiveness Index, and Utilization 
rates in Textiles and Apparel 
 3a: Tariff Peaks and the PSRO index 
 
R-Index valuea,b    
   NAFTA PANEURO 
Tariff peaksc 6.2  (257)  5.18(780) 
Low tariffsd 4.8  (1432)  3.92(3241) 
Total number of tariff 
lines  3555 4961 
 
Tariff peaks (low tariffs) are calculated for all tariff lines that exceed 3 times ( one third of) the average 




3b: Preferences and Utilization Rates in Textiles & Apparel (HS-11) 
(averages, unweighted) 
 
 #Observationse  Utilization rate   Preferential Margin 
NAFTA  (2001)  618  79.9  10.4 
GSP  (2004)  16555(HS-8) 
12920 (HS-6) 
52.2 1.8 




   GSP(92)b  ACP(37) b NAFTAc 
4% τ ≥ a  50.2% (1297)d  92.5% (1627)d  87.0% (1239) d 
8% τ ≥  a  52.5% (91)  94.3% (892)  86.0% (558) 
12% τ ≥ a  66.2% (44)  96.4% (566)  82.8% (287)   24
 
Table 4: Compliance Cost Estimates 
(percentage of unit costs) 
 
   PANEURO  NAFTA 
 Row  Average  i τ  Average  i τ  
   Total Compliance Costs ( C c ) 
0 i u =   1  4.7
C
Li c τ ==   0.3
C
Li c τ ==  
01 i u <<   2  7.2 i c τ = =   6.2 i c τ = =  
1 i u =   3  8.2
C
Ui c τ ==   7.1
C
Ui c τ ==  
   Distortionary cost ( D c ) 
2 i R ≤  &  95% i u ≥   5  3.8
D c τ = =   4.4
D c τ ==  
2 i R ≤  &  90% i u ≥   6  3.9
D c τ = =   4.3
D c τ ==  
   Administrative cost estimate ( D c ) 








=− = − =
=− = − =








=− = − =
=− = − =
 
0 i τ =  & Requestc  8 #  691  linesa   # 1089 linesb 
3% i τ ≤  & Requestc  9  # 2173 linesa  # 1972 linesb 
 
Source:  Cadot et al. (2006a) Table 6. 
 
Notes: Data for NAFTA refer to Mexican exports to the US for 2001.  Data for PANEURO refer to 
request by ACP countries for Cotonou status (data for GSP countries were not used because EBA status 
was only in place since 2001 ) .  Trade-weighted estimates. 
 
a Total number of tariff lines (at HS-6 digit):  19720 
b Total number of tariff lines (at HS-6 digit): 3555 
c  Only for PANEURO 
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Table 5: Value-Content Requirements in EU PTAsa and utilization rates 
 
RVC rateb   Frequency  Percent  i u  (GSP)d 
i u  (ACP)d 
50  4,000  20.55  38%  (2.6)  42%  (2.6) 
60  14,185  72.89  16%  (1.1)  18%  (2.7) 
70  213  1.09  53%  (2.3)  29%  (3.0) 
80  1,012  5.20  50%  (2.9)  93%  (4.3) 
85  52  0.27  44%  (3.6)  0%  (3.7) 
Total 19,642  100  N.A.  N.A. 
5% i τ ≥ c    36%  34% 
10% i τ ≥ c    34%  58% 
 
a Frequency rates are for tariff lines where value-content criterion is the sole criterion 
for obtaining origin 
b The Figures in the column indicate the minimum regional value content to  satisfy 
the sufficient processing threshold 
c From Table 2 
d Utilization rate and average preference rate in parenthesis 
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 Table 6: Determinants of Utilization Rates for EU Preferential Schemes 
(Tariff lines withValue-Content Rule only) 
 
 
   Row 1 (GSP+ACP) 2 (GSP)  3 (ACP)  4 (GSP+ACP)  5 (GSP)  6 (ACP) 
Dependent varb. 
 
i u   i u   i u   i u   i u   i u  
Constant  1  1.58  1.7 14.88  0.43 0.97  10.61 
     (4.52)*** (4.99)***  (10.68)***  -1.01  (2.36)** (6.38)*** 
i τ  (tar. Pref.)(GSP) 
 
2 0.077  0.066    0.05  0.026   
     (12.74)*** (10.89)***    (5.35)***  (2.80)***   
( ) ln i vc  
 
3  -0.632  -0.59  -4.069 -0.309 -0.351 -2.936 
     (7.47)*** (7.14)***  (11.66)***  (3.06)*** (3.56)*** (6.96)*** 
i τ (tar. Pref.)(ACP) 
 
4     0.043     0.03 
       (10.00)***     (6.06)*** 
          
Number of Obser.  5  19261 13448  5857  5958  4305  1697 
Likelihood Ratio 
a  6  263.43(0)  198.83(0)  222.3(0)  47.48(0) 25.5(0) 71.68(0) 
          
Sample restriction 
 
7  ( ) 2% i τ ≥ ( ) 2% i τ ≥ ( ) 2% i τ ≥ ( ) 5% i τ ≥  ( ) 5% i τ ≥  ( ) 5% i τ ≥
10 10 ii i rvc rvc u =− ⇒ Δ  
 
8  2.0% 2.5% 8.2% 5.2% 1.7%  7.9 
           
           
Mean   margin   9  3.74 3.79 5.09 5.14 5.22 9.78 
Mean Utilization Rate  10  0.12 0.17 0.13 0.17 0.22 0.20 
Mean value content  11  58.8 58.9 58.6 58.2 58.6 57.5 
      Simulated utilization rates    
Assumed value for  i rvc  
 
12  40 40 40 40 40 40 
          
Mean MFN tariff (China)  13 10  10  10  10  10  10 
Predicted utlilization rate  14  0.32 0.37 0.45 0.25 0.28 0.40 
          
Mean MFN tariff (Philippines)  15  4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Predicted utlilization rate  16  0.19 0.23 0.40 0.18 0.24 0.36 
           
 
 
Source: Authors’ Computations. See text. 
a The reported likelihood ratio follows a chi-squared distribution with two degrees of 
freedom ()




a Within Andean, ASEAN, CACM, SAARC only and subject to a 50 per cent value added requirement in the country of export. 
b alternative rules for textiles and clothing products, often in terms of weight rather than value 
c up to a maximum of 15 per cent of the value of the product 
d with the additional requirement that the last stage of manufacture be performed in the exporting country 
e excluding automotive products 
Source: WTO (2002) , Brenton (2006) and authors’ compilation 
 
Table A1: Rules of Origin in a Sample Free Trade and Preferential Trade Agreements 
Value Added   CTC 












A. Agreements Involving the EU 
EU PanEur
o 
Yes (4,2)  Yes - Import (50-30%)  50-30%  Yes  Bilateral  
Diagonal 
Yes 10%
b  Yes 
EU 
 







Yes (4,2)  Yes - Import (50-30%)  50-30%  Yes  Full  Yes  15%
b Yes 
EU - Chile  Yes (4,2)  Yes - Import (50-30%)  50-36%  Yes  Bilateral  Yes  10%  Yes 
EU - Mexico  Yes (4,2)  Yes - Import (50-30%)  50-30%  Yes  Bilateral  Yes  10%  Yes 
EU – South 
Africa 
Yes (4,2)  Yes - Import (50-30%)  50-30%  Yes  Bilateral  
Diagonal ACP) 
Full (SACU) 
Yes  15%  Yes 
B. Agreements in the Americas and with US 
NAFTA  Yes (2,4,6)  Yes – Domestic (60-50%)  50-40%  Yes  Bilateral  Yes 7%
b Yes
e 
Canada - Chile  Yes  Yes – Domestic (35-25%)  75-65%  Yes  Bilateral  Yes 9%  Yes 
US-Israel    Yes – Domestic (35%)  65%    Bilateral
c Not  App  Yes 
C. Agreements In Asia/Pacific and with Asian countries 
AFTA    Yes – Import (60%)
d 60%    Diagonal  Not  App   
ANZERTA    Yes – Domestic (50%)
d  50%
   Full  Not  App   
Sing. - Japan  Yes (4, )  Yes – Domestic (60%)  40%  Yes  Bilateral  Yes  No 
Sing.- NZ     Yes - Domestic (40%)
d 60%    Bilateral  Not  App   
Singapore - US  Yes (2,4,6)  Yes – Domestic (55-35%)  65-45%  Yes  Bilateral
  Yes 10%
b No   28
Table A2: PSRO in NAFTA and PANEURO  
(calculated at the HS-6 level tariff line) 
EUROPE AMERICAS 
Requirement  PANEURO  NAFTA   RoO INDEX
a 
NC 0.39  0.54  1 
NC+ECTC 2.39    1-2 
NC+TECH 1.39    2 
NC+ECTC+TECH 0.00    2 
NC+VC 11.46    4-5 
NC+ECTC+VC 1.57    5 
NC+VC+TECH 0.08    7 
NC+WH (CHAPTER)  7.62    1 
NC+WH (HEADING)  0.70    1 
SUBTOTAL  25.60 0.54   
CI      
CI+ECTC   0.02  1 
CI+TECH      
CI+ECTC+TECH      
CI+VC      
CI+ECTC+VC   0.02  2 
CI+VC+TECH      
SUBTOTAL  0.00 0.04   
CS 0.20  1.29  2 
CS+ECTC 0.00  2.52  2 
CS+TECH 1.90  0.04  2 
CS+ECTC+TECH 0.00  0.40  2 
CS+VC 0.27    3 
CS+ECTC+VC 0.00  0.10  3 
CS+VC+TECH 0.00    3 
CS+ECTC+VC+TECH 0.00    3 
SUBTOTAL  2.37 4.35   
CH 32.99  17.09  4 
CH+ECTC 4.60  19.18  4 
CH+TECH 0.00  0.02  4 
CH+ECTC+TECH 6.66  0.14  4 
CH+VC 13.01  3.54  5 
CH+ECTC+VC 0.37  0.58  5 
CH+VC+TECH 0.00  0.10  5 
CH+ECTC+VC+TECH 0.02    5 
SUBTOTAL  57.65 40.65   
CC 2.16  30.95  6 
CC+ECTC 1.02  17.71  6 
CC+TECH 0.04  0.02  6 
CC+ECTC+TECH 11.02  5.76  6 
CC+VC 0.00    7 
CC+ECTC+VC 0.00    7 
CC+VC+TECH 0.00    7 
CC+ECTC+VC+TECH 0.00    7 
SUBTOTAL  14.24  54.44  
TOTAL   100 100   
Sources: Anson, Cadot, Estevadeordal, de Melo and Tumurchudur (2005, Table 1) 
NC= No change; ECTC=exception to change of tariff classification; TECH= technical requirement; 
VC= value content; CI=Change of item; CS= change of subheading; CH=change of heading; 
CC=change of chapter 
a The index ri is calculated at the HS-6 level following Estevadeordal (2000) and takes a value in the 
range 1<ri<7, a higher value indicating a more restrictive RoO (see text). 







Average utilization rates for different thresholds  








































a Unweighted averages computed at the most disaggregated tariff line level (see 
Table 2) . Averages based on over 100 observations except for GSP (minimum of 27 
observations for  20% i τ ≥ )  30
Figure 2: Growing Vertical integration in the World Economy 
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Figure 3: Rule of Origin and Costs 
c0  c1  ciD 